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1969] NOTES
spoon indicates, however, that the time may not be too far dis-
tant when the Court will strike down capital punishment as a
penalty for crime altogether. 43
H. Alston Johnson III
GUILTY PLEAS, JURY TRIAL, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-
The Effects of United States v. Jackson
An indictment charging defendants with violation of the
Federal Kidnapping Act1 was dismissed by the United States
District Court 2 which held the entire statute unconstitutional be-
cause it authorized only the jury to impose capital punishment.3
The principal grounds for the ruling was that the defendant was
required to expose himself to "the risk of death" in order to gain
jury trial. The United States Supreme Court on direct appeal,
agreeing with the district court on the basic constitutional ques-
tion, reversed on the issue of severability 4 and held the death
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act is invalid be-
cause it places an impermissible burden-"the risk of death"-
upon the exercise of the fifth amendment right not to plead
guilty and the sixth amendment right to jury trial. United States
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Jackson is examined here, not because of the specific and
rather narrow holding relative to the Federal Kidnapping Act,
but rather to present and evaluate the reasoning of the court
43. Recent decisions show that the Court tends to regard capital punishment
as suspect, and shows increasing concern about procedure when a man's life hangs
in the balance. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court
held the death penalty could not be imposed on a defendant who had to subject
himself to the risk of capital punishment in order to get a jury trial. Had he
waived the jury trial, the maximum penalty permitted under the applicable
statute was life imprisonment. In a related case, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that a statute permitting the death penalty to be imposed only by the jury
constituted a lop-sided constitutional scheme which could not be justified. Spillers
v. State, 436 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1968).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1958). The charge was that defendants had trans-
ported across state lines a person who had been kidnapped, held for ransom, and
harmed when liberated.
2. United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967).
3. The Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1958), provides:
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce, any person who has
been unlawfully ... kidnapped and held for ransom ... or otherwise ... shall be
punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed,
and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed." (Emphasis added.)
4. The Supreme Court found the death penalty provision a "functionally in-
dependent" part of the statute and held the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty provision did not defeat the validity of the remaining provision.
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and to attempt to assess the implications the decision has for
state statutes imposing capital punishment, particularly those
of Louisiana.
The Constitutional Question
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the six-man majority,5
posed the constitutional question 6 in terms whether a statute
permitting imposition of the death penalty only on those de-
fendants who exercised their right to a jury trial is constitu-
tionally permissible. The answer was negative. Significantly,
the answer is not drawn in narrow and delimiting language. The
Court, with apparently no equivocation, stated: "The inevitable
effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage the as-
sertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and
to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand jury
trial."' 7 (Emphasis added.) Further emphasizing the strength of
its opinion, the Court, in response to the government's position
that the trial judge could be relied upon to reject coerced guilty
pleas and jury waivers, said that "any such provision" which
discourages jury trial and encourages guilty pleas by imposing
"the risk of death" is unconstitutional on its face: ". . . or the
evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty
pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages
them. A procedure need not be inherently . . .coercive in order
that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon assertion
of a constitutional right."8
Many unanswered questions are raised by this apparently
straight-forward decision. Since the defendant may not be "en-
couraged" to waive jury trial or plead guilty by "the risk of
death," does he any longer have a right9 to do either so that he
might avoid jury trial in a capital case? The court recognized
that the total exclusion of trial waiver and guilty pleas is not
desirable in that defendants should be allowed to "spare them-
selves and their families the expense and spectacle of protracted
5. Justice White, who was joined by Justice Black, dissented on the grounds
that he did not feel that the statute was invalid on its face. Justice Marshall did
not participate.
6. The question presented in Jackson was not novel. The lower federal courts,
with the exception of the Connecticut District Court, had consistently upheld the
statute. See Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Seadlund v.
United States, 97 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1938); McDowell v. United States, 274
F. Supp. 426 (D. Tenn. 1967) ; LaBoy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D. N.J.
1967) ; Robinson v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
7. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
8. Id. at 583.
9. The Court had previously held that there is no absolute right to demand
trial without a jury. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
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courtroom proceedings."10 How this goal is to be accomplished,
however, is not elucidated. The court suggested that a jury
might be empaneled in every case to impose punishment. 1 This
would not completely do away with the "expense and spectacle"
since presumably the sentencing jury should be made well aware
of the facts and circumstances of the case in order to properly
impose sentence. This somewhat novel procedure also presents
administrative and procedural problems with which neither the
federal government nor most states are presently equippped to
cope."'
The other alternative1 implied is to allow the court as well
as the jury to impose capital punishment. While procedurally
this might prove more satisfactory, it is generally conceded that
judges do not desire this power nor do legislatures wish to grant
it to them. 14
For those states that allow jury waiver in capital cases,"
Jackson seems to require that either the court be allowed to im-
pose capital punishment or that a jury be empaneled in all cap-
ital cases to impose sentence, even if guilt is determined by the
court.
The standard announced with respect to guilty pleas appears
to have an even greater potential impact. The court clearly stat-
ed that the basis for its decision relative to guilty pleas is not
that they are coerced, but simply that they are needlessly en-
couraged. 16 The statute in question "encouraged" guilty pleas by
allowing one who has pleaded guilty to be subject only to life
imprisonment. This raises the question of how one is to develop
a system which constitutionally allows guilty pleas in capital
cases. Again, the alternatives appear to be either a grant of
power to the court to impose the death sentence or the empanel-
ing of sentencing juries. Either of these routes limits signifi-
10. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968).
11. Id. at 582.
12. The Court itself noted several articles dealing with this problem: Notes,
52 CALIF. L. REV. 386 (1964), 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 50 (1964) ; Comment, 63 COLO.
L. R Ev. 608 (1965).
13. The obvious third alternative is not considered here-the mandatory death
sentence. That alternative is not considered meaningful in light of present-day
trends and is not considered in this Note. See generally H. BEDAU, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA (1967).
14. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. At least two federal
crimes are made punishable by death without a jury. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 34, 1992(1958). Louisiana, to the contrary, prohibits the judge acting alone from imposing
capital punishment. LA. CODE CEIm. P. art. 780.
15. As of 1966, twenty-two states and the federal government allowed waiver
of jury trial in capital cases. See Note, 51 CoRN. L.Q. 339, 342-43 (1966).
16. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
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cantly the flexibility of the criminal justice process. It is true
that the defendant would not be "encouraged" into pleading
guilty, but the result for him is that he is subject to the death
penalty in all cases. Ironically, the Supreme Court is "protect-
ing" the defendant against being "encouraged" by "the risk of
death" into pleading guilty or waiving jury trial to avoid that
risk, with the consequence that he is exposed to "the risk of
death" in every instance.
The Court failed to examine an important facet in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice-the plea bargain.1 7 Plea bar-
gaining in capital cases in light of the constitutional standards
set down in Jackson raises serious and difficult questions. The
argument that a plea bargain encourages the defendant to plead
guilty and discourages the exercise of his right to jury trial and
privilege against self-incrimination seems as tenable a position
(if not more so) as the Jackson position with respect to jury
waiver and non-bargained guilty pleas. If, as the Court found,
the statute in question "needlessly encourages" guilty pleas by
imposing "the risk of death," one is placed in the logically un-
tenable position of arguing that the active and conscious plea
bargaining process does not discourage the exercise of the same
constitutional rights. The Court's language accepted, it seems
necessary to conclude that plea bargaining also imposes an im-
permissible burden on the defendant when he is induced or al-
lowed to plead guilty to a lesser (non-capital) offense. The plea
bargaining process in capital cases actively discourages the ex-
ercise of the rights to jury trial and against self-incrimination.
Again, ironically, the defendant is "protected" against plea-bar-
gaining to the extent that he must be subject to capital punish-
ment.
In sum, the Court is saying that the defendant cannot be
"encouraged" to waive his right to jury trial and privilege
against self-incrimination at "the risk of death." The necessary
result is that the defendant who desires to waive these rights to
avoid "the risk of death" is left no opportunity. Practically, of
course, the ruling has the effect of striking down the death penal-
ty provision itself. The Court is thus forcing the federal govern-
ment and those states that wish to impose capital punishment
and allow jury waiver and/or guilty pleas into either granting
the court that power without a jury or requiring the empaneling
17. See D. NEWMANN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR IN-




of a jury to impose sentence no matter how guilt has been de-
termined. Congress and those states affected by the ruling are
faced with the problem that if they desire to keep the death pen-
alty, a more rigid procedure must be adhered to with the con-
sequence of creating greater potential liability to all defendants.
Under these circumstances, capital punishment would (or should)
be subject to re-evaluation which would very likely result in
fewer supporters. One can only speculate as to whether this was
an intentional consequence, but the possibility should not be
overlooked.' 8
Implications for Louisiana
Louisiana has five capital crimes.' 9 The remaining inquiry
attempts to examine the impact of Jackson on the penalty pro-
vision of these crimes. Spillers v. State,2° a Nevada case, provides
further perspective for examining Jackson's implications for
Louisiana. Spillers held that a rape statute which imposed capital
punishment "if the jury by their verdict affix the death pen-
alty"21 was unconstitutional. Significantly, the United States Su-
preme Court in Jackson noted the case approvingly. 2 The Nevada
Supreme Court pointed out that Spillers could not have been sen-
tenced to death if he had either pleaded guilty to the crime or
waived jury trial. They found the statute provided "[a] coercion
• . . to forego that right [jury trial] and prefer court adjudi-
cation, since the court is powerless to order death." 2 3
Louisiana's position is ostensibly different from that of
Nevada and the Federal Kidnapping Act in that it does not allow
a defendant in a capital case to waive jury trial.2 4 A Louisiana
defendant cannot through a jury trial waiver (as distinguished
from a guilty plea) be "encouraged" to forego his right to jury
trial. The Code of Criminal Procedure also does not allow the
court to receive an unqualified plea of guilty in capital cases.2 5
It does, however, specifically provide that "the defendant, with
the consent of the district attorney may plead 'guilty without
18. In light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29
LA. L. REv. 381 (1969), there is little doubt that the Court is developing stringent
constitutional requirements for capital cases.
19. LA. R.S. 14:30 (murder), 14:42 (aggravated rape), 14:44 (aggravated
kidnapping), 14:113 (treason), 40:981 (narcotics) (1950).
20. 436 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1968).
21. NEv. R.S. 200.360(1) (1963).
22. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 n.24 (1968).
23. Spillers v. Nevada, 436 P.2d 18, 22 (Nev. 1968).
24. LA. CODE CaiM. P. art. 780.
25. Id. art. 557.
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capital punishment.' "26 This provision is, in effect, a statutory
authorization for plea bargaining in capital cases. The question
becomes whether this procedure is constitutionally permissible
under the Jackson standards.
The answer is suggested by paraphrasing the language in
Jackson: 7 in a capital case in Louisiana, the defendant's as-
sertion of the right to jury trial may cost him his life, for the
state's provision allows the jury-and only the jury-to return
a verdict of death. The inevitable effect of the provision is to
encourage defendants to plead "guilty without capital punish-
ment" if they can obtain the district attorney's consent.
Louisiana's procedure thus appears to be only technically
different from that involved in Jackson and Spillers. In Jackson,
the government argued that the court's authority to reject
"coerced" guilty pleas was enough to save the statute. The court
flatly rejected that contention. How can one argue that the
district attorney's role of consent saves the Louisiana provision?
Again, paraphrasing Jackson2 it might be argued the evil in the
statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas but simply
that it needlessly encourages them. The defendant in Louisiana
is certainly "encouraged" to "bargain" with the district attorney
and plead guilty to avoid the risk of death. Jackson reasoning
accepted, this discourages the exercise of his right not to plead
guilty and his right of jury trial.
Applying the same constitutional reasoning that the Supreme
Court used in Jackson and which it endorsed in Spillers, the
Louisiana capital punishment provisions are unconstitutional on
their face.
Very recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit issued an opinion which supports this position.
In Alford v. North Carolina 2 9 the court held: "[T] hat in the
present posture of the North Carolina statutes the various provi-
sions for the imposition of the death penalty are unconstitutional
and hence capital punishment may not under Jackson be imposed
under any circumstances [footnote omitted]."
26. Id.
27. 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968).
28. Id. at 583.
29. Docket No. 11,598, U.S. Ct. App. 4th Cir., Nov. 26, 1968. The statutory
scheme relevant for comparison to Louisiana's is found N.C. GEN. STAT. 5
15-162.1(a), (b) (1965).
[Vol. XXIX
This decision is of particular interest because the North
Carolina statutory scheme relative to capital punishment is
substantially the same as that of Louisiana. The defendant can-
not receive the death penalty except by a jury's verdict and the
only way to avoid a jury trial and "the risk of death" is to plead
guilty.
Conclusion
Accepting that the Louisiana capital punishment provisions
are, at least, constitutionally suspect and more probably un-
constitutional, what response should be taken? The first ques-
tion that must be answered is basically normative; that is,
whether Louisiana should maintain a death sentence. The stan-
dards set out in Jackson will certainly influence that decision,
but it remains essentially normative and outside the scope of
this inquiry.
Assuming the normative question is resolved in favor of
maintaining capital punishment in at least some instances, the
empirical question becomes, how to satisfy the requirements of
Jackson with an economy of change in Louisiana criminal pro-
cedure. The legislature has apparently already decided that it
is undesirable to impose this awesome responsibility on judges
alone and also that mandatory death sentences reduce the flex-
ibility of criminal procedure so greatly as not to be considered
acceptable alternatives.
Since the defendant's right to waive jury trial and his right
to plead guilty without qualification are already denied, the
further prohibition against accepting any guilty pleas in capital
cases appears to be the least drastic change from present criminal
procedures (the significance of this change should not be over-
looked however, especially in light of negotiated pleas). By so
prohibiting guilty pleas, the problem of both "voluntary" and
bargained guilty pleas being encouraged is completely eliminated.
The result, of course, is that anyone charged and indicted with
a capital crime is potentially subject to the death penalty re-
gardless of his or the district attorney's actions. A greater
responsibility is thus put upon the district attorney to decide
at the outset whether the defendant, under all the circumstances,
should be subject to this great liability. Once that decision has
been made, it would be up to the jury to determine the merits
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of it. In this connection, the Whitherspoon30 decision relative to
standards for selecting jurors in capital cases makes the prob-
ability of getting a death penalty slight.
P. Raymond Lamonica
A CASE FOR THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
noted in this issue1 and the nationwide debate which preceded
them seriously question the advisability and constitutionality
of capital punishment. This note will examine the legislative and
judicial considerations bearing on these questions.
Legislative Considerations
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Edward Livingston,
in his proposed penal code, advocated "the total abolition of
capital punishment. ' ' 2 The Louisiana legislature rejected his
recommendations, but his work has been repeatedly cited in
later years by those who seek the repeal of capital punishment.
In its 1968 session, the Louisiana legislature again considered
the advisability of a death penalty in a bill calling for its suspen-
sion for six years. 3 However, again it was defeated. The follow-
ing factors normally form, expressly or impliedly, a part of the
consideration of such a proposal. 4
Deterrence
Every year about six in every 100,000 of the population com-
mit capital crimes in spite of the possible capital punishment.
The question here is whether a change in statutory penalty to
long-term imprisonment would serve as an equal deterrent.5
30. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. REV.
381 (1969).
1. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), noted in 29 LA. L. REV.
381 (1969), and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), noted in 29
LA. L. REV. 389 (1969).
2. 2 E. LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LTVINGSTON 244
(1873).
3. La. H. Bill 303 (1968).
4. From 1930-1966 Louisiana has electrocuted 133 men. There were 39
electrocutions from 1930-1934, 19 from 1935-1940, 24 from 1940-1944, 23 from
1945-1949, 14 from 1950-1954, 13 from 1955-1959, and 1 in 1961. Of the 133
electrocuted, 30 were white and 103 were Negroes. There have been 116 electro-
cutions for murder; 30 white, and 86 Negro; and 17 for rape, all Negroes. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Bull. No. 41, National Prisoner Statistics, Executions, 1930-1966,
at 10, 12 (April, 1967).
5. H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 261 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as BEDAu).
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